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The relationship between the 
modern corporation and its leader-
ship has undergone a sea change over 
the past 30 years. The large industrial 
corporation appeared to be a serene 
republic, protected like 14th century 
new era of heightened creative destruction that 
began in the late 1970s also ushered in a new 
era of heightened competition. Such intensified 
competition has made leaders of large
industrial enterprises vulnerable to a level of uncertainty 
previously reserved for managers of small and new firms. 
Consequently, managerial careers now less often have 
benign endings. In addition, CEOs have become less 
reliable servants of the corporation. The story was much 
different during the previous 100 years. From the 1870s 
to the 1970s, the large industrial corporation was highly 
stable. Its stability was derived, in part, from investments 
in a corporate structure that centered on a sales and 
administrative staff. In this article, Leonard Nakamura 
argues that the electronics revolution of the 1970s sharply 
reduced the value of this corporate asset and made 
corporations more susceptible to competition. 
1 Economist Joseph Schumpeter coined the 
phrase creative destruction. Schumpeter theo-
rized that creativity was the prime engine in a 
modern economy and profits were the fuel. Al-
lowing creative workers to temporarily capture 
monopoly profits — for example, by granting 
patents — promotes “creative destruction”: new 
goods and livelihoods replace old ones. See my 
Business Review article from 2000.
Venice by a beneficent nature and as 
likely to exist for centuries.  The leader 
of this corporation — the chief execu-
tive — was a sort of philosopher king, 
dealing with long-term strategic issues 
and delegating most of the direct over-
sight of the corporation’s daily opera-
tions to the chief operating officer.
In his introduction to A.P. 
Sloan’s memoir, My Years with General 
Motors, Peter Drucker described the 
General Motors’ president’s relation-
ship to the founding of Chrysler Mo-
tors: “Chrysler started the automobile 
company that bears his name in large 
part because Sloan pointed out to him 
the opportunity created by the decline 
of the Ford Motor Company in the 
mid-twenties, but also because Sloan 
clearly saw that with Ford rapidly go-
ing downhill, GM, in its own interest, 
needed a strong competitor.” This pas-
sage forcefully calls to mind a different 
era, a time when corporate managers 
were so secure in their corporations’ 
solidity that they could deliberately 
encourage the growth of a formidable 
competitor. This is a far cry from GM’s 
aggressive and successful legal pursuit 
of European purchasing manager Jose 
Ignacio Lopez when he left General 
Motors to work for Volkswagen in 
1993. (GM forced Volkswagen to fire 
Lopez and recompense GM for the 
secrets Lopez took with him.)
There have been sweeping 
changes in the corporate environment 
since the late 1970s, when the new 
era of heightened creative destruction 
emerged.1  In this new era, heightened 
competition has made leaders of large 
industrial enterprises vulnerable to a 
level of uncertainty previously reserved 
for managers of small and new firms. 
Chief executives of Fortune 500 corpo-
rations were once seen as professional, 
farsighted, and deeply interested in the 
longevity of their firms; now they find 
their ability to control their destinies 
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This heightened competition 
— firms’ ability to enter and conquer 
markets via new products and pro-
cesses — need not imply small firms 
or profits. It may well involve a series 
of firms that rapidly prosper and attain 
substantial profits and size, such as 
Microsoft or Merck. But attaining and 
maintaining profits has become more 
hazardous work. Managers and share-
holders find their firms increasingly 
at risk, both from outside competitors 
and from insiders who threaten to take 
their talents and become competitors.  
The upshot has been that 
managerial careers now less often have 
benign endings.  Forced resignations 
of corporate CEOs have become more 
common, and more CEOs are hired 
from outside the firm, rather than be-
ing promoted from among the ranks of 
its senior executives (see the study by 
Huson, Parrino, and Starks). Corpo-
rate leaders have found themselves in a 
harsher economic environment, their 
jobs riskier, their boards more demand-
ing.  
In their turn, CEOs may have 
become less reliable agents for their 
shareholders and boards of directors.  
It should not be surprising if CEOs 
demand higher wages to compensate 
for their greater risk.  Nor is it a great 
stretch to imagine that boards must 
deepen their oversight over CEOs in 
order to maximize shareholder value 
in this new environment. Indeed, 
although this is a conjecture that 
has not been researched, the recent 
spectacular examples of corporate 
fraud may partly be a byproduct of the 
decline in solidarity between share-
holders and their corporate employees.  
The story was much differ-
ent in the previous century. The large 
industrial corporation was highly 
stable from the 1870s to the 1970s. Ac-
cording to Alfred Chandler, Harvard 
Business School’s august historian of 
business, this stability was based both 
on tangible investments in plant and 
equipment and on investments in a 
corporate structure whose core pur-
pose was information processing: the 
sales and administrative staff. I argue 
that the electronics revolution in the 
1970s sharply reduced the value of this 
corporate asset and made corporations 
far more vulnerable to competition. 
CREATORS AND CLERKS:
OCCUPATIONAL CHANGE 
FROM 1900 to 1980  
Chandler wrote two influ-
ential tomes on the rise and stability 
of the great industrial corporation: 
The Visible Hand and Scale and Scope. 
Chandler showed that many of the 
corporations that were the first mod-
ern large producers in their industries 
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
were still leading their industries in the 
1970s. He attributed this longevity to 
three complementary investments:
Investment 1: Production. The 
first investment was in a large, scale-
economy production facility.  Typically, 
the scale of this plant was substantially 
larger than its competitors’, enabling 
substantially cheaper production and 
larger profits. In several cases, a few 
plants accounted for a substantial frac-
tion of the industry’s total capacity. Of 
course, this physical investment was 
not easily expropriated by employees of 
the firm. One cannot easily imagine a 
disgruntled group of managers resign-
ing en masse and taking with them 
an oil-refining complex or a section of 
railroad, complete with trains!  
This physical investment was 
buttressed by additional investments 
in information, or rather in corporate 
employees whose collective task was to 
process information.
Investment 2: Sales. One task 
was collecting information about the 
corporation’s customers. A large and 
efficient production facility, after all, is 
valuable only if its immense output can 
be sold. This required a disciplined, 
intelligent, and well-trained sales force. 
The sales force was the eyes, ears, and 
voice of the corporation for its custom-
ers, in a period when orders, invoices, 
and payments were processed by hand 
or typed. 
Investment 3. Coordination.  
The corporation also needed to create 
a management and clerical team that 
coordinated sales and production deci-
sions and accounted for every order, 
invoice, and item in inventory. Within 
the extended bureaucratic hierarchy 
of the great corporation, accurate 
financial and operational data were 
crucial to permitting individual units 
to act autonomously while remaining 
accountable to the firm as a whole. It 
also enabled management to identify 
problems promptly, allocate resources 
overall, and plan for future ventures. 
This coordinating mechanism was the 
nervous system of the great industrial 
corporation.
Chandler showed that these 
three complementary investments 
formed a barrier to entry that few 
potential entrants could surmount. 
One way of articulating Chandler’s 
argument is that the sales force and 
coordinating management protected 
the production facility investment 
Within the extended bureaucratic hierarchy
of the great corporation, accurate financial
and operational data were crucial to permitting 
individual units to act autonomously while
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As corporations became 
arenas for professional advancement, 
the career concerns of management 
bent the interests of the corporation 
toward corporate stability. Indeed, 
in the 1960s and 1970s, as Gordon 
Donaldson has written, “The essence 
of the corporate mission … at many 
… companies of that day was the 
concept of the individual corporation 
as an independent and self-sustaining 
economic and financial entity within 
which all primary constituent interests, 
including shareholders, could fulfill 
their economic objectives.  Growth, 
diversification, and a higher degree of 
independence from the public capital 
markets were essential ingredients of 
long-term economic self-sufficiency.”6
In that era in which diversification of 
shareholders was still limited, reduc-
ing corporate risk was often seen as 
valuable to the shareholders as well as 
to employers.
Donaldson also noted 
another aspect that characterized the 
corporation then: “Jobholders at all 
levels have traditionally looked to the 
individual corporation as the source of 
their lifetime economic welfare. It was 
an expectation to be encouraged, since 
an unconditional commitment from 
2 The existence of entry barriers did not imply, 
of course, complete freedom from failure for the 
incumbent. A large corporation could fail to 
take advantage of its market position and ignore 
rather than adopt and improve upon rivals’ in-
novations. Indeed, Ford Motor Company failed 
to follow General Motors’ market segmentation 
strategy for over two decades and might well 
have disappeared. But the very fact that Ford 
could turn itself around after World War II is 
testimony to the great stability of large corpora-
tions during most of this period.
against technological innovation. For 
example, suppose a new technologi-
cal innovation made a market leader’s 
production facility obsolete. Before an 
entrant could take full advantage of 
the innovation, it would have to build 
up a sales force and management bu-
reaucracy, an expensive and time-con-
suming affair. In the intervening time, 
the incumbent could usually duplicate 
the innovation and keep most of the 
business for itself.2  
One example Chandler gives 
is the Standard Oil Company, whose 
Cleveland refineries in 1870 were the 
largest in the world. Standard Oil’s 
large volume enabled it to garner 
special deals from railroads and to 
develop an alliance of oil refiners 
that controlled much of the kerosene 
output of the U.S. To break the power 
of the Standard Oil alliance, crude-oil 
producers set up the rival Tidewater 
Oil Company with new technology: 
Tidewater built a huge pipeline from 
northwest Pennsylvania to Bayonne, 
New Jersey, where the company 
eventually built a massive refinery. But 
the Standard Oil alliance was able to 
maintain overall dominance of the 
kerosene market because of its greater 
organizational capabilities. It con-
structed its own pipeline, even though 
doing so required an investment 
10 times its previous capitalization, 
and built new, even larger refineries 
because it maintained its domination 
over kerosene sales. Indeed, Tidewater 
was dependent on Standard Oil to 
market Tidewater’s kerosene in Europe. 
As Chandler laconically puts it, “Not 
surprisingly, Tidewater soon came 
under the financial control of Stan-
dard Oil.”3
Although challengers to 
the market leaders did appear, the 
number of players in many industries 
where these barriers to entry existed 
remained small, and there was little 
turnover among the leaders.  The 
corporations that led industries in 
1890 or 1915 often still led them in 
1975. As these corporations grew — as 
Standard Oil grew from kerosene to 
gasoline, as Ford grew from Model Ts 
to Tauruses, and as DuPont grew from 
gunpowder to synthetics — so did 
their corporate and sales staffs. 4
In addition, corporate man-
agers developed a new professional 
attitude. In discussing the develop-
ment of the railroads, Chandler noted 
that “because of the special skills and 
training required and the existence of 
a managerial hierarchy, the railroad 
managers came to look on their work 
as much more of a lifetime career than 






career concerns of 
management bent 
the interests of the 
corporation toward 
corporate stability.
3 See Chandler, Scale and Scope, p. 95.
4Alfred Chandler’s vision of the rise of the 
American corporation remains the central 
academic interpretation. While Chandler’s 
work has been criticized, it has largely stood the 
test of time, and most of the critiques to date 
have modified rather than overthrown its basic 
themes.  See, for example, Louis Galambos’s 
review article on “The U.S. Corporate Economy 
in the Twentieth Century,” and its bibliographic 
note, in the Cambridge Economic History of the 
United States.
Some economic historians have em-
phasized the role of government in helping 
maintain and develop the market power of the 
great industrial corporations.  In this view, 
government regulation of public utilities and 
transportation, as exemplified by the regulated 
monopoly of the Bell System, provided crucial 
support for the large industrial corporation.  But 
government regulation itself is likely to stifle 
productivity rather than enhance it.  We have 
to turn to Chandler to understand why the large 
industrial corporations grew and were able to 
sell aggressively in competitive world markets.
5 See Chandler, The Visible Hand, p. 87.
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the workforce served the best interest 
of corporate leadership.” 7
THE RISE OF THE
CHANDLERIAN WORKERS: 
CLERKS, MANAGERS, AND 
CREATORS  
Until about 1980, the 
continuing rise of the industrial state 
required an increasing proportion 
of information processing workers 
because, until then, office informa-
tion remained expensive to automate.  
From 1900 to 1980, as mass production 
spread over the American economy, 
the sales and clerical workforce rose 
from being a relatively minor compo-
nent of American employment to one 
of the largest:  from 7.5 percent of total 
employment to 27.3 percent, about 2.5 
percentage points a decade (Figure 1). 
By comparison, agricultural workers 
(including farmers and farm manag-
ers) represented 37.5 percent of the 
workforce in 1900, while blue collar 
workers (craft workers, operatives, 
and laborers) represented 35.8 per-
cent of the workforce in that year. By 
1980, agricultural workers had nearly 
disappeared, falling to 2.9 percent of 
the workforce, and blue collar work-
ers, while remaining comparatively 
unchanged, still fell to 31.2 percent of 
the workforce.
Corporate managers also 
increased substantially as a propor-
tion of the workforce, rising from 5.8 
percent of total employment to 10.3 
percent over the same period (Figure 
1). Management during this period 
was self-confident, foresighted, and 
autonomous to an extent almost 
unheard of today. Managing a firm was 
by no means easy: Leaders such as A.P. 
Sloan of General Motors and Thomas 
Watson of IBM ran their firms during 
the uncertainties and difficulties of 
the Great Depression and World War 
II. But despite these difficulties, the 
FIGURE 1
From 1900 to 1980, sales and clerical workers 
rose from 7.5% to 27.3% of all workers
(2.5 percentage points per decade) 
large industrial corporation assumed a 
magisterial, almost immortal stature. 
Managers climbed the corporate bu-
reaucracy secure in the knowledge that 
whether they as individuals won or lost 
in the corporate game, the positions 
at the top would remain to be handed 
down by the incumbents.
Creativity on a Tight Leash.
Of course, corporations had to develop 
new products, with all the risks that 
doing so entailed. But their competi-
tion tended to come from their peers 
— other incumbent large corporations 
— rather than from smaller firms. 
Competition among incumbents meant 
that each firm had to be solicitous of 
its existing stable of products. New 
product introduction was generally or-
derly, so as not to excessively cannibal-
ize currently profitable products.  
Who created these new 
products? The occupations most 
directly concerned with creativity 
include engineers, scientists (including 
computer systems analysts and scien-
tists), and writers, artists, entertainers, 
and athletes. These workers, whom I 
call creative workers, are most closely 
associated with research and develop-
ment (R&D), software, design, the 
arts, and the media. Between 1900 and 
1980, creative workers as a proportion 
of the workforce base rose faster than 
either the sales force or management 
segments, quintupling from 0.7 percent 
to 3.8 percent. 
But creative workers were 
not the masters of this world; manag-
ers were. If new products came into 
conflict with existing products, the 
new products gave way, and the exist-
ing products remained. During most of 
this period, creative employees gener-
ally found it difficult to strike out on 
their own because the manufacturing 
plants, distribution systems, and their 
corporate bureaucracies were crucial 
to bringing new products rapidly to 
market. 
7Donaldson, p. 25.
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A clear example of the 
corporation’s control over creativity is 
the annual model changeover insti-
tuted by General Motors as a means of 
maximizing profitability. General Mo-
tors orchestrated the rate of change of 
models in terms of styling and techno-
logical progress, introducing techno-
logical innovations in its top-of-the-
line cars and bringing them, over time, 
to its entire product line. The phrase 
“planned obsolescence,” which was 
widely used in the 1950s, described 
a sales effort to encourage drivers to 
trade in their cars for the latest model 
and bespoke the corporation’s control 
over the rate of technological change.
 In this ancien régime of the 
stable corporation, creators were nei-
ther as important to corporate profits 
nor as much of a threat as they would 
soon be. The great industrial corpora-
tions performed most of the private 
research and development in the U.S. 
Creativity was leashed, and the man-
agers were in control.  
In the 1970s, however, 
distribution channels began changing 
more rapidly, as information process-
ing became increasingly automated.  
Advances in electronics began to out-
mode many of the roles of information 
workers.  An indication of the chang-
ing usefulness of electronics is that 
from 1977 to 1985, business investment 
in computers rose abruptly in eco-
nomic importance. This was associated 
with the deployment of PCs, minicom-
puters, and video terminals, which 
increasingly permitted the processing, 
transfer, and storage of information 
with little or no human intervention. 
Computer purchases rose from 0.3 
percent of GDP to 0.8 percent (Figure 
2). This was the starting point of the 
computer’s becoming — through its 
remarkable technological progress 
— ubiquitous. The proportion of the 
U.S. economy’s resources used to pro-
duce computers has remained roughly 
at this level ever since 1985.
THE RISE OF COMPUTERS AND 
THE DECLINE OF THE TYPING 
POOL: 1977 TO 2002
In the wake of this eruption 
of expenditure on computer hard-
ware, the growth of sales and clerical 
employment slowed dramatically. Some 
occupations, such as typists, began to 
decline absolutely.  If the trend in the 
growth of the number of clerks estab-
lished from 1900 to 1980 had contin-
ued to the end of the century, these 
workers would have been 32.5 percent 
of the workforce. Instead, sales and 
clerical workers were 25 percent of the 
workforce, less than the 27.3 percent 
in 1980 (Figure 3).8
In short, the electronics revo-
lution of the 1970s made large chunks 
of the existing corporate bureaucracy 
obsolete. The investment that corpora-
tions had made in these information 
systems was sharply devalued. The 
automation of information meant that 
new entrants could far more easily 
enter markets, particularly if they had 
technology that could surpass that of 
the existing market leader.  
For example, the size of stores 
and the number of different items on 
their shelves increased substantially 
because it became easier for store man-
agers to track sales and inventory, to 
change prices, and to order new stock.9
Indeed, tracking sales and ordering 
FIGURE 2
Investment in Computers Surged
from 1977 to 1985*
*Gross private investment in computers, nominal
Source:  U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
8 These data are based on the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics’ 1990 system for categorizing 
occupations.  In the 2000 census, a new system 
was used, which raised the proportion of sales 
and clerical workers by about 1 percentage 
point.
9 To give one example, variety at the average 
supermarket accelerated in 1980s and 1990s 
(see my 1999 article). Items per store in grocery 
supermarkets surveyed in Progressive Grocer
magazine rose 2.7 percent annually from 1960 
to 1970 and 1.8 percent annually from 1970 to 
1980. By contrast, from 1980 to 1990, items per 
store rose 5.8 percent annually, and from 1990 
to 1994, 4.4 percent annually.  With the stores 
providing more space, the rate of innovation 
accelerated.  Annual new product introductions 
in grocery categories rose from 1,365 in 1970 to 
2,689 in 1980 to 13,244 in 1990.38   Q3  2004 Business Review   www.phil.frb.org   Business Review  Q3  2004   39 www.phil.frb.org
FIGURE 3
Sales and clerical worker growth slowed in the 
late 1970s and began to decline in the late 1980s
Source:  U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
fresh stock could increasingly be done 
at the national level. That, in turn, 
implied less need for a manufacturer to 
send sales workers to individual stores: 
A sales pitch at the retailer’s corporate 
headquarters could stand in for a hun-
dred visits to store managers. And that 
might give a new manufacturer access 
to consumers in numbers near those of 
an established industrial giant.  
Microsoft routed IBM from 
the market for personal computer 
software despite the fact that IBM 
had as many as 400,000 employees in 
the mid-1980s, while Microsoft had 
fewer than 2,000 as late as the end of 
1987. Microsoft did not suffer the fate 
of the Tidewater Oil Company: Its 
lack of an extensive corporate bureau-
cracy and sales force did not prevent it 
from selling to millions of consumers. 
Of course, the Internet has further 
expanded small firms’ ability to rapidly 
seize markets with new products.  
Consequently, many large 
industrial corporations whose sales 
and clerical workforce had become 
outmoded by the electronics revolu-
tion have found themselves besieged 
by sharply increased competition. The 
workforce that had been a barrier 
to entry could actually impair the 
corporation’s ability to resist entry by 
a superior product, since laying off or 
retiring the now-redundant workers is 
typically an expensive and disruptive 
process.  Naomi Lamoreaux, Daniel 
Raff, and Peter Temin have also
written about the decline of the
Chandlerian corporation in this 
period, emphasizing the inability of 
these corporations to change rapidly in 
response to these new conditions.
As these natural barriers to 
entry were falling, artificial barriers 
such as tariffs and government regula-
tion were also being reduced. Global-
ization has increased foreign com-
petitors’ ability to enter our markets 
and, at the same time, has increased 
the value of new products by widen-
ing the potential market for them. 
Deregulation has reduced or removed 
government protection of monopoly 
power. Telecommunications, trucking, 
airlines, banking, electric utilities, and 
pharmaceutical companies have been 
subject to changes in regulation that 
have increased competition.  
In principle, globalization 
could have increased the power and 
stability of large industrial corpora-
tions, as the global reach of their mar-
keting expanded. In practice, the great 
industrial corporations did not fare 
well. GM, Ford, and Chrysler found 
their market successfully invaded by 
Japanese and German competitors. 
Xerox, IBM, Kodak, Caterpillar, U.S. 
Steel, AT&T — icons of American 
industry — all lost their once-solid 
grips on their core markets. 
McKinsey management 
consultant Tom Peters had been a 
follower of Chandler in 1982, arguing 
in his bestseller In Search of Excellence
(written with Bob Waterman) that 
the large industrial corporation could 
be successful as long as its sales force 
enabled it to pay close attention to 
its customers. But the very corpora-
tions that Peters held up as models of 
excellence in 1982 stumbled badly as 
the decade progressed. As the great 
industrial corporations revealed feet 
of clay, Peters turned apostate in 1987, 
proclaiming in the introduction to his 
new bestseller Thriving on Chaos (p.3), 
“There are no excellent corporations.”
Increasing Competition 
Means Increased Risk.  As the large 
industrial corporation lost its ability to 
defend its markets, creativity became 
the new key to profitability. But inno-
vations are very risky. A very few have 
extraordinarily large returns, while 
most others have little or no value. 
F.M. Scherer and Dietmar Harhoff 
have shown this for a variety of groups 
of patented and licensed products
in Germany and the U.S. One new 
data set they constructed is based on 
corporate estimates of the value of pat-
ents originating in Germany and the 
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of patents filed in Germany in 1977, 
all of which had sufficient value to 
warrant paying 16,000 deutsche marks 
(roughly $13,000 in today’s dollars) in 
annual renewal fees until the patents’ 
expiration at full term in 1995. Scherer 
and Harhoff asked the corporations 
that had owned the patents what the 
total value of the patents had been 
during their lifetimes. Of the more 
than 600 patents originating in Ger-
many, they found that the most valu-
able five patents made up 54 percent 
of the total value of the entire group 
of patents. And the top 60 patents 
made up 80 percent.  With innova-
tions so risky, the corporate pursuit of 
innovation as the main source of profit 
implies more risk for the corporation.
Further evidence of the riski-
ness of creativity comes from research 
on its impact on future earnings 
arising from R&D expenditures. S.P. 
Kothari, Ted Laguerre, and Andrew 
Leone showed that from 1972 to 1997, 
R&D investments generated future 
earnings that were three times as 
uncertain as investments in plant and 
equipment; investments in advertising 
were about as risky as investments in 
plant and equipment.10
As competition to produce 
innovations has accelerated, corpora-
tions have faced increased individual 
risk, as reflected in the stock market 
volatility of corporate share prices. 
Financial analysts distinguish the 
risks that are faced by individual firms 
separately from general economic or 
market conditions (“idiosyncratic” 
risks), such as the failure of individual 
products or brands, and risks, such as 
interest-rate changes, that are common 
to the entire stock market (“aggre-
gate” risk) and to all firms within a 
given industry (“industry” risk). John 
Campbell and co-authors documented 
that idiosyncratic corporate risk rose 
substantially relative to market and 
industry risk. During the period they 
examined (1962 to 1997), overall mar-
ket risk increased very little. But when 
the risk of individual shares is broken 
out into aggregate risk, industry risk, 
and idiosyncratic firm risk, it is evident 
that idiosyncratic risk rose substan-
tially after 1980. Thus, it appears that 
the heightened competition between 
corporations translated directly into 
heightened risk for the individual 
corporation. This heightened risk has 
a direct consequence: Hedging idio-
syncratic risk requires more diversifica-
tion. Through the 1970s a portfolio of 
20 stocks was considered big enough to 
diversify away most idiosyncratic risk. 
By the early 1990s, that was no longer 
true; instead, Campbell and co-authors 
found that it took 50 stocks to achieve 
the same benefits of diversification. On 
the other hand, this greater risk to the 
individual corporation appears to have 
gone hand in hand with investors’ in-
creasing familiarity with mutual funds 
that enabled stock market investors to 
inexpensively diversify their holdings.
Some of this increased risk 
may well be due to the riskiness of 
creativity. The authors also suggest 
that some of this risk may be due to 
changes in corporate governance. 
There has been a strong tendency 
over the past two decades to break up 
conglomerates and replace them with 
firms that specialize in a given indus-
try, as described in Mitchell Berlin’s 
10 They measure uncertainty of future earnings 
by using the standard deviation of after-tax 
corporate profits in the five years after the in-
vestment.
As competition to produce innovations
has accelerated, corporations have faced
increased individual risk, as reflected in
the stock market volatility of corporate
share prices. 
article. This tendency, in turn, may be 
due to improved financial markets that 
can provide firms with good access to 
capital despite heightened risk.  Share-
holders, being more diversified, could 
afford to ignore the heightened risk of 
individual corporations.  
CORPORATE AMERICA
ADJUSTS TO GREATER RISK
How did this heightened risk 
affect corporate management? Recent 
research suggests one consequence: In 
recent years, boards of directors and 
block shareholders more frequently 
either forced out the existing chief ex-
ecutive or replaced the chief executive 
with a new leader drawn from outside 
the corporation.    
Heightened Risk for Man-
agers. Mark Huson, Robert Parrino, 
and Laura Starks documented the 
rise of forced turnover and outsider 
succession from 1971 to 1994. In their 
data on leaders of major corporations, 
the proportion of involuntary turn-
overs among corporate chief executive 
officers rose from 10 percent (1971-76) 
to 23 percent (1989-94). Similarly, 
successions in which outsiders were 
appointed chief executive officer 
rose from 15 percent (1971-76) to 30 
percent (1989-94).  When an outsider 
becomes CEO, the corporate board is 
failing to use this ultimate promotion 
as a reward for current managers, thus 
expressing a lack of faith in existing 
management. 
Did this change occur 
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There is no doubt that the rise of 
institutional management of pensions 
and mutual funds and other large 
pools of investment funds, including 
those of corporate raiders, has made 
the typical shareholder more mobile, 
less concerned with the stability of 
individual shares, and more concerned 
with market risk-adjusted rates of re-
turn. However, Huson and co-authors 
showed that this rise does not appear 
to have been driven by changes in 
corporate governance or the intensity 
of the takeover market. Instead, it 
appears that corporate risk — profit 
slowdowns and stock declines — was 
the driving factor. 
Thus, it appears that corpo-
rate leaders more often were viewed as 
failing to maximize the corporation’s 
value in the intense competition that 
developed over the course of the 1980s 
and 1990s.   The intense competition 
apparently made corporate boards 
believe that the right CEO was a rare 
individual and not necessarily one who 
could be found within the ranks of the 
corporation itself.  
In addition, directors and 
shareholders may believe that only an 
outsider can carry out the success-
ful restructuring of a corporation. If, 
for example, a corporation needs to 
dispose of core parts of the business, 
an insider may be too loyal to the past 
vision of the corporation to take the 
necessary steps quickly enough for 
corporate survival.  
Structural Change in the 
Corporation. Another reaction to 
heightened risk was that top managers 
became busier. The corporate hier-
archy has tended to flatten out, with 
more managers reporting directly to 
the chief executive officer. Raghuram 
Rajan and Julie Wulf documented that 
corporations became flatter between 
1986 and 1999. By 1999, the average 
chief executive officer had more posi-
tions reporting directly: on average, 7.2 
positions, up from 4.4 in 1986. Thus, 
it appears that the CEO now has more 
day-to-day responsibilities. In keep-
ing with this, fewer layers intervene 
between the CEO and division heads 
(the lowest managers with profit center 
responsibility), and the average firm 
has shed more than one layer. This cir-
cumstance does not reflect larger divi-
sions (divisions shrank in size) or more 
employees in the corporation (the 
average remained roughly constant). 
Rajan and Wulf argue that this repre-
sents firms with more human capital 
than physical capital. One interpreta-
tion is that it reflects a switch from the 
Chandlerian corporation to a more 
creative and competitive environment.  
A free and rapid flow of ideas into 
action has become more important.  A 
world of intense competition in new 
products is a world in which the pres-
sure to bring a new product to market 
before one’s rivals may require a leaner 
corporation.    
More Expropriability? An-
other reason that corporations may 
have become flatter is that creativity is 
more expropriable than hardware. In 
the ancien régime of the Chandlerian 
corporation, which was centered on 
physical investment in a production 
facility, this type of expropriation was 
difficult to achieve. 
Rajan and Luigi Zingales 
argue that pieces of the corporation 
may break off and compete against the 
original corporation: A middle manag-
er can leave the firm and take subordi-
nates along. But age is a counterweight 
to defections: Senior managers have 
less to gain by defection because their 
post-defection working life is short. If 
creative workers need their managers 
to cooperate with them in a startup to 
rival the original firm, flattening may 
help prevent departures by making 
the CEO and senior managers too 
important a part of each team to make 
departures tempting. While Rajan 
and Zingales have emphasized the 
organizational changes that accom-
pany a shift away from physical capital 
to human capital, George Mailath 
and Andrew Postlewaite highlight a 
counteracting force that limits em-
ployees’ ability to defect or to threaten 
defection in a firm where a large share 
of assets are intangible. They argue 
that it may be difficult for employees 
to coordinate their defection when 
the number of employees needed for a 
successful defection is large.  
The reduction in the number 
of layers in the corporation and the 
rise in the number of individuals 
reporting to the chief executive officer 
imply more work day-to-day for the 
CEO than formerly. The corporate 
CEO has less time to focus on very 
long-term corporate issues. But this 
may not be such a great loss in a world 
that, because it is rapidly changing, 
may be less predictable. 
A FRESH WIND FOR
CAPITALISM?
I have argued that the rise 
of computers in the 1970s made life 
riskier for the large industrial corpora-
tion. The result has been more entry 
The reduction in the number of layers in the 
corporation and the rise in the number of indi-
viduals reporting to the chief executive officer 
imply more work day-to-day for the CEO than 
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by smaller firms, more new product 
competition, and compelling vitality 
for the U.S. economy. The cost has 
been that life at the top within the 
large corporation has become tougher: 
riskier, faster, busier. Corporate hierar-
chies have flattened, and CEOs spend 
more time with their division heads 
and perhaps less time contemplating 
the long view.
Corporate executives are 
being treated as if their decisions mat-
tered much more to corporate profit-
ability and are being held accountable 
accordingly. The talent and effort 
required to successfully run a corpora-
tion may well have risen substantially. 
In such circumstances, it would be 
surprising if corporate salaries were not 
rising to compensate for the height-
ened demands and shortened careers. 
All this implies greater 
conflict in the relationships among 
shareholders, boards of directors, and 
top corporate officers.  Recent episodes 
of corporate wrongdoing may be a 
symptom of uneven progress toward 
new institutional structures.
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